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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the study is to establish the epistemological limits of the symbolic description of the consciousness functions. 
As a result of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that consciousness cannot be explained in computational 
terms, as there is something in its activity that goes beyond purely algorithmic actions. This is due to the small resource 
of human memory and there is no clearly fixed, clear purpose. In a situation of such uncertainty, it is impossible to build 
a clear algorithm of actions in advance, so a person is “doomed” to be a free and creative being. According to the author, 
consciousness is always opened through activity when it correlates behavior with space-time, cultural contexts, therefore, the 
existential basis of consciousness is revealed through its manifestation in the “world of ideas”, in the “world of values”, as 
well as in the “world of activity”, which helps to overcome the boundaries between these worlds in a single integrity of being.
Keywords: consciousness, artificial intelligence, meme, being, culture, behaviorism, functionalism
RESUMEN
El propósito del estudio es establecer los límites epistemológicos de la descripción simbólica de las funciones de conciencia. 
Como resultado del estudio, el autor llega a la conclusión de que la conciencia no puede explicarse en términos computacionales, 
ya que hay algo en su actividad que va más allá de las acciones puramente algorítmicas. Esto se debe al pequeño recurso de 
la memoria humana y no existe un propósito claro y fijo. En una situación de tanta incertidumbre, es imposible construir 
un algoritmo claro de acciones por adelantado, por lo que una persona está “condenada” a ser un ser libre y creativo. Según 
el autor, la conciencia siempre se abre a través de la actividad cuando correlaciona el comportamiento con el espacio-tiempo, 
los contextos culturales, por lo tanto, la base existencial de la conciencia se revela a través de su manifestación en el “mundo 
de las ideas”, en el “mundo de los valores”, así como en el “mundo de la actividad”, que ayuda a superar los límites entre estos 
mundos en una sola integridad de ser.
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Introduction
Modern philosophy of consciousness cannot be imagined in isolation from cybernetics, especially from research in 
the field of AI. The reason for this convergence is, first of all, methodological prerequisites. For the methodology 
of classical science an exemplary example of rational thinking is the logical conclusion. The emergence of a new 
“symbolic” logic in the late XIX century is based on the idea that the rules of such a conclusion can be set purely 
symbolic (formal, syntactic) means. This led to the idea that one could “think” of all cognitive operations in terms 
of symbol manipulation. One of the embodiments of this idea is the use of concepts such as “language of thought”. 
According to the thought of Ya. Hintikka, this ideology of symbolic logic helped to inspire the development of 
computer technology (Hintikka, 2011: p. 10).
Computers do perform, in electronic or mechanical terms, operations that were previously performed only by 
consciously directed actions of the human mind. AI technology is trying to reproduce cognitive operations with the 
help of computer programs. However, it was found that actual reasoning could not be fully represented by purely 
symbolic means. For example, it is possible to present all truths of elementary arithmetic as logical consequences 
of the corresponding logical axioms, but it is impossible to program the computer so that it consistently, one after 
another, deduced all these consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the basic epistemological limits 
of the paradigm of thinking as a symbolic process, which is a purely philosophical task, as these limitations are 
conceptual and methodological (Abuzjarova, 2018: 21).
Another question becomes relevant: how legitimate is the very comparison of the human mind with a digital 
computer, consciousness with a computer program? The comparison of consciousness with a computer program 
leads to the emergence of an erroneous hypothesis based on logical substitution, that the peculiarity of the brain, 
which serves as a conductor of consciousness, is its computational nature. Tens of billions of neurons in the 
brain are able to implement complex algorithms, the totality of which can be called consciousness. The program 
involves the implementation of an algorithm for formal character processing, without taking into account their 
possible interpretation. Classic computers work with such syntactic programs. However, the problem is that NI 
does not work as a program at all. If I say, “She is beautiful like a flower”, it does not mean that I have to study 
botany to understand her better. The same logical substitution lies in the hypothesis of the “computational nature 
of consciousness”.
However, the idea of the computational nature of consciousness has a large number of supporters. It is reflected in 
the concepts of functionalism: the functionalism of the Turing machine (Putnam, 1960), information-procedural 
AI theory (Dennett, 1991), the functionalism of the “language of thought” (Fodor, 1975), neurophysiological 
functionalism (Churchland, 2005), etc. (See table 1)
Table 1. The idea of consciousness and mental processes in functionalism 
The concepts of 
functionalism 
Basic ideas
The functionalism of 
the Turing machine 
(Putnam)
Mental states of consciousness are neutral functional states similar to the 
logical states of the Turing machine. 
The same mental state can be realized on different material carriers. 
In the study of mental states of consciousness, a relational methodology is 
used to study the causal relations of logical states in their interaction with 
physical and behavioral states.
Information-
procedural AI theory 
(Dennett)
The optimal language for describing the mental activity of consciousness is 
neutral computer language, not mental or physical.
The ratio of consciousness to the brain is compared with the ratio of the 
“soft” computer program to its “hard” structure.
Consciousness is reduced to cognitive information processes. 
Subjective experiences of consciousness (“qualia”) are excluded from its 
theoretical description. 
Functionalism of the 
“language of thought” 
(Fodor)
Mental processes of consciousness are carried out through mental 
representations, which should be considered as intermediaries, which 
have all the key characteristics of language.  There are different forms of 
physical embodiment of mental representations. In living organisms, they 
are represented by neurophysiological structures of the brain.
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Neurophysiological 
functionalism 
(Churchland)
Consciousness is represented by countless information systems and 
operations that were created by billions of years of evolution, they are 
difficult to simulate.
The key to understanding consciousness should be sought in the study of 
the dynamic properties of biological neural networks with high-frequency 
physical architecture. 
H. Dreyfus was the first who subjected to detailed criticism the comparison of consciousness with artificial 
intelligence (computer program). In his work “What computers cannot do” the philosopher concludes that 
algorithmic modeling of human needs, motives and goal-setting activities is not feasible (Dreyfus, 1975). A great 
contribution to the disclosure of this problem was made by John Lucas, stating “Godel’s argument” against 
artificial intelligence. Subsequently this argument was updated and significantly increased by R. Penrose, arguing 
that conscious brain activity is fundamentally impossible to explain in computational terms (Penrose, 2003: p. 7). 
In the ability of man to know and in his conscious activity as a whole there is something beyond purely algorithmic 
actions (See table 2).
Table 2. Criticism of artificial intelligence 
The position of AI supporters Criticism of the AI supporters position 
The brain works like a computer, 
and the mind works like software. 
Any activity can be 
mathematically formalized in the 
form of rules and laws.
Reasoning and intellectual behavior of a person depend primarily on 
unconscious instincts that are opposed to conscious manipulation of symbolic 
information. The unconscious inherent in man cannot be embodied in a 
machine using formal rules (H. Dreyfus).
The brain is a kind of “machine” 
whose functions can be described 
quite clearly and unambiguously 
in the form of a final instruction.
It is problematic to write a clear, unambiguous, final instruction for AI, based 
on which it would be possible to simulate the activity of the human psyche. 
Gödel’s theorem proves that the functions of consciousness are not computable 
algorithmically. This gives the superiority of consciousness over the machine, 
because due to this feature it is able to solve problems that are insoluble for 
algorithmic systems (J. Lucas.)
Mind performs discrete 
calculations (in the form of 
algorithmic rules), therefore, it 
is a formal system that functions 
similarly to AI.
Gödel’s theorem proves that not only mathematical conclusions, but all the 
processes associated with the work of the brain, consciousness and thinking, 
cannot be fully formalized and “quantifiable”. Human consciousness is a 
deterministic system without being algorithmic. Such deterministic and at the 
same time non-algorithmic processes can play a role in the quantum mechanical 
wave reduction function and can be used by the brain (R. Penrose).
Methods
We consider phenomenological, constructivist and informational approaches to be methodologically productive 
in the study of consciousness. Constructivist approach allows expanding the boundaries of the phenomenon of 
consciousness, overcoming its “specifically human” characteristics. It is possible to postulate the presence of a 
certain “consciousness in general”, reflecting in its ideal plan a much larger totality of being than only human 
consciousness, but everywhere realizing itself in constructive activity (Bogdanova, 2016). The constructivist 
approach focuses attention on the activity side of consciousness, which in its ideal plan leads to the supervent 
conjugation of the basic structures of being. Phenomenological approach allows us to explore the value-semantic 
and activity-volitional structure of subjective reality (consciousness) and the ability to implement all this in the 
information interaction through a sign-symbolic code. Information campaign allows discovering the genetic 
prerequisites of consciousness (information, information interaction), which should be considered as an attribute 
property of existence.
Results
The question of “smart machines” is largely mythologized in modern culture. Those who work directly in the field 
of AI, robotics (e.g., H. Ishiguro) are especially clearly aware of this because neither they nor other scientists or 
philosophers have not defined the goals and prospects for further research in this area.  “It is impossible not to notice, 
– notes Yu. Yu. Petrunin, – that even the most sophisticated and effective program, skillfully imitating human 
intellectual activity, for the person, understanding mechanisms of its work, loses all visibility of “reasonableness” 
(Petrunin, 1994: p. 32). 
For those who in their research is on the methodological position of classical science, the question of “thinking” 
machine is relevant, because from the point of view of this methodology, consciousness is largely identical to 
thinking. The fact is that thinking is a very broad concept, so in the classical philosophical tradition, certainty 
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was achieved through additional clarifying concepts that characterize “thinking” – the concepts of “intelligence” 
and “mind”. In relation to the intellectual manifestation of the intelligence is the action pattern, a manifestation 
of the mind – the action of new, not pre-specified way. The machine chooses from the already available options, 
but it is not able to synthesize a new method of action. For example, the choice of a word’s meaning in a person is 
determined by the context of that or other situation, but the context itself cannot be built into the whole variety 
of meanings, therefore, the choice of context cannot be programmed to the machine. But the machine can be 
programmed with a goal to which it must strive, in addition, it should be borne in mind that the patterns of actions 
that can be stored in the memory of the machine, disproportionately more than can buy an individual in his life. 
Man is forced to resort to creativity at his own risk, largely due to lack of information. The machine has no such 
information deficit. If there is a clear goal and defined “rules of the game” (because not only technology, but also 
culture is based on such principles), the greater chance of success in targeted activities has improved “intelligence” 
than the creative “mind”. So to the question “Can a computer think?” one can answer in the affirmative if thinking 
means following the defining rules.
The problem of the comparison of consciousness with the program 
The assumption of creating artificial intelligence, which is not inferior to the human mind, leads to the idea that 
consciousness is not a material property of man. But what is it in this case? The method of analytical philosophy, 
which is dominant in almost all modern concepts of the philosophy of consciousness, requires starting with the 
study of the vocabulary, through which we express the phenomena given in the experience. Language and its 
contexts is a socially guaranteed tool. However, the meaning of language expressions may also be closely related to 
neurophysiological states. For example, it can be recorded empirically that certain thoughts correspond to certain 
wave oscillations in the cerebral cortex, in which it is possible to distinguish alpha, beta, delta and tetra waves.
In this “cognitive behaviorism” philosophers rightly saw a strong simplification of real life and activities related to 
consciousness. Based on the experimental data of cognitive sciences, one can see a huge variety of rules, schemes, 
conventions, etc., used as an explanation of the observed patterns of human activity, including social life. All this 
shows that social cognitive process is primary in relation to individual acts of thinking. The mental is nothing 
but a stream of individual and social symbolic patterns created and managed by human agents in accordance 
with local norms and conventions. That is why D. Dennett comes to the idea that for a rational explanation of 
consciousness it is enough to turn to the analysis of culture. Solving the problem of explaining consciousness, 
Dennett applies the R. Dawkins’ hypothesis of “memes”. “Memes” are the fundamental units of culture. “Memes” 
are created, perceived, transmitted and “introduced” into the hereditary program of a person in the form of 
so-called “selfish genes” of the brain (Vasilyev,, 2009: p. 122). “Human consciousness itself is a huge complex of 
memes (or, more precisely, memo-effects in the brain)” (Dennett, 1991: p. 210). “Each “meme” is an algorithm, a 
cultural or behavioral simulation; therefore “meme” can be given a scientific formalized description in the form 
of a simple program. However, Dennett does not offer a clear procedure to identify and describe these “memes”. 
In this case, “meme” is nothing more than another concept designed to explain the nature and functions of 
consciousness, but it does not have the status of a scientific fact, because it is not available for empirical fixation.
In his theoretical constructions, Dennett draws an analogy between the work of consciousness and a computer 
program, which brings his views closer to functionalism. Functionalism is based on relational methodology in the 
study of consciousness, without linking its characteristic properties with the nature of its carrier. The basic principle 
of functionalism on the multiple implementations of functions indicates the isomorphism of systems that may 
have different properties and structures, but perform the same functions. This means that the functions of mental 
states can be traced not only on the material of the brain, a computer or theoretically any conceivable artificial 
intelligent systems (“silicone brains”) can be considered as their carrier with some degree of conditionality. It is not 
the material properties of the system and not the special “spirituality” of conscious processes, but the stable nature 
of the functional connection. In this approach, the binary oppositions of classical scientific rationality (mind-body, 
monism-dualism, and reductionism-non-reductionism) have no methodological meaning (Vinnik, 2010: p. 39). 
The comparison of consciousness with a computer program leads Dennett to the idea that the functional relations 
of psychological states of consciousness can be described in a neutral language, which is neither physicalist nor 
mentalist, although the functions of consciousness are associated with the work of physical structures.
The mechanism of thinking, whatever it is, must be meaningful. Understanding involves setting goals and 
objectives of thinking by the subject. In the Dennett’s concept, the work of human consciousness is not different 
from the behavior of a complex robot. The main function of the psyche is to process information. The nervous 
system can be compared to an information network that is connected to the body through special nodes – sensors 
(or input devices) and effectors (or output devices). A sensor is any device that receives information from one 
environment and transmits it to another. In a computer, the role of input devices is performed by a keyboard, 
mouse, microphone, television camera, which translate external information into an electronic environment, 
where it is stored in the form of “bits”.
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However, in a computer there is a very clear boundary between the “outside” world and information channels, 
which cannot be said about a person. In humans, much of the information generated by its own structures, and 
the existence of the structures of the “external” world independent of them is always in question. On the basis of 
this representative of radical constructivism G. Roth defines the human brain as an autonomous and operationally 
closed system. The incoming information from the environment is translated into neurodynamic processes of 
the brain and thus already loses its original properties and characteristics. Receptors in the form of neural code 
transmit information to the brain, but it is completely modified. Only one hundred thousandth part of the brain 
activity is caused by the work of the senses, the rest of the brain activity is aimed at constructive activities carried 
out on the basis of their own information. Thus, the brain does not “reflect” the world, but constructs reality from 
“raw” data obtained from the senses and a large number of innate and acquired cognitive structures (Kezin, 2004: 
p. 14).
Such designs are not arbitrary; they are created according to criteria that are either innate or based on individual 
experience. Not only the process of transformation of information from the outside into neurodynamic processes 
is interesting and inexplicable, but also the transition of material processes of the brain into intangible states 
of consciousness. Dennett notes that if nerve impulses are to be regarded as the matter of consciousness, then 
the nervous system should resemble a telephone network without subscribers or a television network without 
spectators. A person used to believe that there should be a Central Agent, a Spectator, and Boss who accepts, 
transforms, evaluates information and uses it in his activities. Many people consider consciousness as a certain 
essence of such “Boss”. Dennett believes that this approach is wrong, because it is impossible to separate the 
individual from his body, containing a large amount of coded information. Consequently, the brain cannot be 
considered as the host of the body, it is just one of the organs among many others. The functions of the brain can 
only be properly understood if you consider it not as a master, but as another rather restless servant working for 
the body (Dennett, 2004:  p. 83-86).
However, Dennett calls to abandon the identification of the psyche not only with the brain, but also with the 
body as such. If a person’s consciousness is like a program, and behind any program there is a programmer who 
determines its content, then who or what performs the role of the programmer of consciousness? Dennett argues 
that the programmer is Darwinian natural selection, which contributes to the formation of behavioral patterns, 
the implementation of which is conducive to survival and procreation. It is natural selection that establishes 
appropriate, “intelligent” behavior that helps to adapt to the conditions of the environment. Intelligent behavior 
is usually described with intentional idioms, in the language of mental, conscious states (Vasilyev,, 2009: p. 116). 
Significant for the body reactions to environmental stimuli are formed under the influence of natural selection and 
are fixed at the level of neural connections in the brain. Schemes of neural connections can be interpreted as a kind 
of programs that control the behavior of the body (Vasilyev, 2009: p. 119).
But in addition to genetically determined schemes human consciousness contains data of individual experience 
that a person receives, plunging into the socio-cultural environment. In this environment, the individual essence 
of consciousness also disappears, because it is completely dissolved in this environment, is derived from it. The 
appearance of the individual consciousness, the one Self, creates a natural language that connects the sketches of 
“texts” from the received sensory information. Human consciousness is formed as a result of the superposition of 
language and culture structures on the biological substrate (brain) through training and education (Yulina, 2011). 
Thus, according to Dennett, human consciousness is not only a product of natural selection, but also the result 
of socio-cultural construction. Consciousness seems to man something individual, unique, personal, because a 
person simply has no idea about all its components and its genesis (Dennett, 2004: p.158).
The Dennett’s concept can be attributed to a kind of behaviorism. Consciousness consists of many information 
flows caused by physical mechanisms and culture. Information flows compete for access to the brain. Human 
behavior depends on what information flow will take over the function of control. There is no single control center 
in the subject, which would direct these flows in the right direction. Dennett has no evaluative consciousness, and 
no “qualia”. He ignores those aspects of consciousness that are the most mysterious and in need of explanation. 
But even this is not the main problem of his theory, and that the activity of consciousness becomes programmed 
and meaningless. It is only the unconscious realization of cultural and evolutionary programs.
Conclusion
The intentionality of consciousness is impossible without understanding. It is necessary to use a dynamic 
approach to mental phenomena, considering them as attributes of samples of meaningful actions, unfolding in 
close connection with each other, which opens up opportunities for new models of explanation of the sequential 
development of events instead of the model of cause-and-effect relations, borrowed from classical physics. For 
example, many events can be understood if we take into account the need to follow conventions, goals, ideals. This 
is something like a compass needle, consistent with the local (and global) structures of the magnetic field. This 
deviation of the trajectory of movement can be called a “discursive turn” (R. Harre), the transition of the system 
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from the readiness to react less differentially to the readiness in the same situation to react more differentially, 
which marks the rejection of the principles of causality and opens up new opportunities for solving the problem 
of consciousness. Mental activity of consciousness is the manipulation of symbols in accordance with the rules, 
designed for certain purposes. If we want to determine the meaning of a particular behavior of the system or 
understand the purpose of some of its actions, we must know what rules the system followed in this case, to what 
purpose it sought. It should be noted that the target conditionality of search in humans is fundamentally non-
algorithmic. People cannot search for a goal using a single algorithm. But when a person has a clear goal, he “finds” 
it; he will inevitably perceive it as a kind of reality, objectivity, truth, and not as a figment of his own imagination. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that successful work requires a clear goal. To move effectively towards the goal you 
need to work with the available information consistently and systematically, weed out the excess and leave the 
main thing, that is, in fact, to set goals. The psychologist V.P. Zinchenko believes that successful results in any 
kind of activity, where a person is involved, are possible only because of his freedom. “The existence of freedom 
in choosing and positing goals inevitably entails freedom in the choice of means and methods of achieving the 
result. The absence of any of these components or its rigid fixation transforms mental activity into something else, 
for example, into artificial intelligence” (Zinchenko, 2011: p. 191). We fully agree with that statement. AI frees a 
person from the routine “rational” functions to develop an algorithm of actions and sequence of tasks, providing 
NI with time and effort for the “creative” goal search. Thus, if we compare human consciousness with AI, we can 
find qualitative differences in the flow of information processes in consciousness and artificial intelligence (the 
differences are reflected in the table 3).
Table 3. Comparative analysis of consciousness and artificial intelligence 
Parameter to compare Consciousness Artificial intelligence
The ability to store information and 
operate it in the presence of a specific 
task 
Capable capable
Feature of information processing Parallel processing of huge amounts 
of information data in the structures 
of the brain 
Linear information processing 
The existence of “qualia” Having “qualia” No
The ability to synthesize a new way 
of acting based on the context of the 
situation 
Capable to develop a new strategy Selects from available pre- programmed 
options
The ability to understand the context 
of an expression (situation)
Captures the context and thinks 
within it (acts on it)
Does not capture the context as its 
selection cannot be programmed
Having a clear goal before the start of 
active actions
Active action can be taken without 
a clear objective
The goal is programmed and 
implemented in the actions of the 
system 
Target search Not implemented by a single 
algorithm
To be carried out by a single algorithm
Formalization of activities It goes beyond the algorithmic 
rules, because the purpose of 
the activity is not always clearly 
expressed, the consciousness 
functions in conditions of lack of 
information
There is no shortage of information, 
a goal is clearly set, so there is the full 
formalization of activities
The ability to exercise freedom and 
creativity 
Capable Incapable
Orientation of consciousness to the purposes, ideal plans is the evidence that existence is much richer than the 
content of initial representations of consciousness, but implementation of this or that activity is impossible 
without these representations. To overcome this contradictory position, it is believed that consciousness from the 
very beginning is a social product. However, it can be assumed that the social nature of consciousness hides an even 
more large-scale and powerful source of its genesis and development. Public consciousness should be considered 
only as a private form of reflection of real life, which in its totality includes both society and nature as a whole. 
Therefore, for the formation of ideal plans of this real integral being, new permanent improving structures of 
consciousness, overcoming its individual and social forms, are required.
Consciousness opens up through activity when it relates behavior to spatial-temporal, cultural contexts. Thus 
consciousness and activity are a contradictory unity. “Consciousness”  is not just an epithet used in relation to 
the concept of “activity”, it is its essential property is included in the definition of activity. Although society, 
at first glance, always emphasizes the importance of consciousness, nevertheless, its real measures are directed 
to transformative activities. Social, mental and technical aspects of these activities represent the functional 
manifestations of a single in its existential basis of consciousness. Consciousness is present in the “world of ideas”, 
concepts, meanings, scientific knowledge; and in the “world of values”, emotions and meanings; and in the “world 
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of images”, representations, symbols and signs; as well as in the “world of activity” (projective and reproducing). 
As consciousness exists in each of these worlds, it possesses not only reflexive but also existential features. It solves 
certain essential problems in the structure of being, responds to its “calling”, directs, according to V. I. Vernadsky, 
“unconscious aspirations of science and technology” and in general human activity to overcome the boundaries 
between these worlds in the unity of being (Vernadsky, 2012).
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